Let q > 1 be an integer and let a and b be elements of the residue ring Z Z q of integers modulo q. We show how, when given a polynomial f ∈ Z Z q [X] and approximations to v 0 , v 1 ∈ Z Z q such that v 1 ≡ f (v 0 ) mod q one can recover v 0 and v 1 efficiently. This result has direct applications to predicting the polynomial congruential generator: a sequence (v n ) of pseudorandom numbers defined by the relation
Introduction
For an integer q > 1 we denote by Z Z q the residue ring of integers modulo q. We always represent the residue classes from Z Z q by elements of the set {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. As usual, we denote by Z Z * q the set of invertible elements of Z Z q .
Accordingly, for a prime p, we denote by IF p ∼ = Z Z p the field of p elements and as before, we assume that it is represented by the set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. In particular, sometimes, where obvious, we treat elements of Z Z q and IF p as integers in the above range.
Here we consider the noisy polynomial evaluation problem in Z Z q : given a polynomial f (X) ∈ Z Z q [X] and approximations to v 0 , v 1 ∈ Z Z q , where v 1 ≡ f (v 0 ) mod q, recover v 0 and v 1 . By an approximation to an integer v i , we mean an integer w i such that |w i − v i | is small.
The question has applications to, and has been motivated by, the predictability problem for non-linear pseudorandom number generators. To be more precise, given a polynomial f (X) ∈ Z Z q [X], we define the polynomial congruential generator to be a sequence (v n ) of elements of Z Z q satisfying the recurrence relation
where v 0 is the initial value. If deg f = m then we say that the polynomial congruential generator is of degree m.
This generator exhibits very attractive uniformity of distribution and nonlinearity properties, see [?, ?] for surveys or recent results. Here we study some of its cryptographic properties, namely the question of so-called predictability of such generators.
In the cryptographic setting, the initial value v 0 (and sometimes the polynomial f and the modulus q) is assumed to be secret, and we want to use the output of the generator as a stream cipher. In this setting, we output only the most significant bits of each v n in the hope that this makes the resulting output sequence difficult to predict. (Note that if we remove the k least significant bits of each v n , an evesdropper may easily find integers w n such that |w n − v n | ≤ 2 k−1 by examining the output. This is the connection to the noisy polynomial evaluation problem.) The main result of this paper may be interpreted as saying that if f and q are public, and if too many bits of the elements v n are output at each stage, then the generator becomes insecure because the elements v n may be efficiently recovered from the output. Slightly more precisely, we show that the polynomial congruential generator is polynomial time (in log q and deg f ) predictable if sufficiently many bits of its consecutive elements are revealed (even if the degree of the generator is allowed to slowly grow together with the size of the modulus q). Our results exclude a small set of polynomials f , and a small set of starting values v 0 : see Theorems ?? and ?? for the details. In the final section of the paper, we discuss the case when the polynomial f forms part of the secret key, and show that the unique recovery of the elements v n from the output is not possible.
For the linear congruential generator [?, ?] , the dimension of our lattices grows as deg f grows, and thus slightly different tools need to be applied.
In some sense the problem we solve can be considered as a special case of the problem of finding small solutions of multivariate polynomial congru-ences. For polynomial congruences in one variable, an algorithm for solving this problem has been given by Coppersmith [?] , see also [?, ?] . However, in the general case only heuristic results are known. Here we are able to obtain rigorous results, due to the special structure of the polynomials involved.
Throughout the paper, the constants in the 'O'-notation are absolute. 
Preliminaries

Background on Lattices
is called an s-dimensional lattice with basis {b 1 , . . . , b s }. If s = r, the lattice L is of full rank. One basic lattice problem is the shortest vector problem: given a basis of a lattice L in IR s , find a nonzero lattice vector f ∈ L which minimises the Euclidean norm f among all lattice vectors. Unfortunately, there are several indications that this problem is NP-complete (when the dimension grows). In particular, it is shown in [?] that the shortest vector problem is NP-hard under randomized reductions, and so it is now widely believed that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve SVP. For a slightly weaker task of finding a short vector, the celebrated LLL algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [?] provides a desirable solution. We however use a slightly stronger result which follows from [?] , and which we state as Lemma ??.
We always assume that the basis of L consists of vectors with rational components. Thus a polynomial time algorithm for L means an algorithm whose running time is polynomial in the total number of bits required for binary representation of numerators and denominators of all components of the basis. Lemma 1. There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which, when given an s-dimensional full rank lattice L, finds a non-zero lattice vector f ∈ L satisfying the inequality
Many other results on both exact and approximate finding of a shortest vector in a lattice are discussed in [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]; see also [?] for the most recent developments (which however lead to probabilistic algorithms).
In fact, in this paper we consider only very special lattices. Namely, we consider only lattices which consist of integer solutions x = (x 0 , . . . , x s−1 ) ∈ Z Z s of the system of congruences
modulo some integers q 1 , . . . , q . The lattices we consider are full rank lattices of dimension s. All the aforementioned algorithms become polynomial in log(q 1 . . . q ) when applied to such lattices.
Polynomial Congruences
Our second basic tool is an upper bound on the number of solutions of polynomial congruences.
For congruences modulo a prime we can use the Lagrange theorem which asserts that a non-zero polynomial of degree s over any field has no more than s zeros in this field.
However for congruences modulo composite numbers we apply an upper bound from [?] .
For a polynomial
of degree s and an integer Q ≥ 1 we denote by T (F, Q) the number of solutions of the congruence
We now define N s (Q) as the largest possible value of T (F, Q) taken over all polynomials (??) with gcd(A 0 , . . . , A s , Q) = 1. (Note that there is no restriction on A 0 .)
The following bound is a relaxed form of the main result of [?].
Lemma 2. The bound
holds.
We apply the Lagrange theorem and Lemma ?? to some families of polynomials parametrised by small vectors in a certain lattice, thus the size of the family can be kept under control. Zeros of these polynomials correspond to potentially "bad" initial values of the polynomial congruential generator (??). Thus, if all polynomials in this family are not identical to zero modulo q (or to be more precise, have a not too large value of D in (??)) then we have an upper bound on the number of such "bad" initial values. Hence, the most crucial part of our approach is to study possible vanishing of polynomials in the above family and to show that this may happen only for very few values of the coefficients of the generator (??).
Residues of Small-Height Fractions
Some exceptional sets of parameters in our results can be described as sets of residues of fractions with bounded numerator and denominator. Namely, let F(q, R, S) be the set of a ∈ Z Z * q that satisfy a congruence of the form ar ≡ s mod q for some integers r and s, not both zero modulo q, where |r| ≤ R and |s| ≤ S.
As usual, we use σ(q) to denote the sum of divisors of q.
Lemma 3. For any 1 ≤ R, S < q, the bound
Proof. For every a ∈ Z Z * q , the congruence ar ≡ s mod q implies gcd(r, q) gcd(s, q).
We count the elements of F(q, R, S) by first choosing a divisor d < q of q, then choosing r and s such that |r| ≤ R, |s| ≤ S, gcd(r, q) = d and d|s, and finally choosing a such that ar ≡ s mod q. Note that once d is chosen, there are at most 2R/d choices for r and at most 2S/d choices for s (because 1 ≤ R, S < q we see that rs = 0). Moreover, once r and s such that gcd(r, q) = d are fixed, there are at most d choices for a. Hence
which finishes the proof.
Recall that σ(q) = O (q log log q) ; see [?, Theorem 323]. In particular, #F(q, R, S) = O (RS log log q) .
Main Results
Predicting the Polynomial Generator Modulo an Arbitrary Integer
Let ∆ be a positive integer. We say an integer w is a ∆-approximation to an integer v if |w − v| ≤ ∆.
Recall that we use σ(q) to denote the sum of the divisors of an integer q, and we define λ s to be the "stretch" factor λ s given in Lemma ??.
We are now ready to state the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 4.
There exists an algorithm with the following properties. Let q and ∆ be integers such that q > ∆ ≥ 1 and gcd(q, ∆) = 1. Let
be a polynomial of degree m ≥ 2 over Z Z q whose leading coefficient a m lies in Z Z * q \A m (q, ∆), for some set A m (q, ∆) of cardinality at most
The algorithm, when given f and ∆-approximations w 0 , w 1 to v 0 , v 1 where
, where
Proof. We may assume that
for if either of these inequalities fail to hold the result is trivially true (by examining bound on the cardinality of the set A m (q, ∆)). We define the set A m (q, ∆) = F(q, R, S), with R = 2 √ m + 2 λ m+2 ∆ m and S = 2 √ m + 2 λ m+2 ∆, where F(q, R, S) is defined in Section ??. By (??) we see that R < S < q. Now the bound on #A m (q, ∆) is immediate by Lemma ??.
An outline of the algorithm is as follows. The algorithm first constructs a lattice L from the information it is given. This lattice has a short non-zero vector e which may be used to derive v 0 and v 1 from w 0 and w 1 . The lattice L has the additional property that any reasonably short vector in L is parallel to e. It is also important to observe that the bit-size of all coordinates of the basis vectors of L is O(log q). The algorithm finds a reasonably short non-zero vector f ∈ L by using the techniques of Lemma ??. It is then easy to find e and hence v 0 and v 1 .
Let ε j = v j − w j , j = 0, 1. Then we have
If we expand the right hand side of this equation in terms of powers of 0 using Taylor's formula, and then introduce various powers of ∆ that cancel each other, we obtain
where
and f (i) denotes the ith derivative of f . Let L be the lattice consisting of integer solutions x = (x 0 , . . . , x m+1 ) ∈ Z Z m+2 of the system of congruences:
Note that L can be computed from the information given to the algorithm and in fact it is easy to see that it is a simple linear algebra problem to compute a basis of L whose basis vectors consist of elements of bit-size O(log q). Clearly, L contains the non-zero vector
. . , ∆ m−i+1 e i , . . . , e m+1 ).
We have
Since ∆ ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2, we see that the Euclidean norm e of e satisfies the inequality
The algorithm of Lemma ?? applied to the lattice L returns a non-zero vector
In particular, we have the inequalities
We aim to show that f is parallel to e, provided that v 0 does not lie in a set V(f ) which we define below. The vector f 0 e − e 0 f ∈ L has first component zero, and so using the first congruence in (??) we obtain
Using the definitions of B and C 1 , . . . , C m (and the fact that C m is equal to the leading coefficient a m of f (X)) we have Substituting w 0 = v 0 − ε 0 in the congruence (??), we obtain the congruence
where 
Note that this coefficient is non-zero modulo q since a m ∈ Z Z * q and that by (??)
by our assumption (??). Moreover we see that
Thus by (??) we see that each congruence (??) can be satisfied by at most
where the last equality follows from (??). Thus we have placed at most O m2
. By (??) the total number of possible choices for the integers d i , i = 1, . . . , m + 1, is at most
and the total number of possible choices for ε 0 is at most 2∆ + 1. Thus the total number of values of v 0 that we have placed in V(f ) is
We have shown that e and f are always parallel, for otherwise v 0 would lie in the set V(f ) of values which we have excluded. Since e 0 = 1, we find that e = f /f 0 and thus the algorithm may now recover e from f . Obviously, given the third component ∆ m−1 ε 0 of e the algorithm can find v 0 . This completes the proof.
Predicting the Polynomial Generator Modulo a Prime
Let p be a prime. Let ∆ and m be integers such that p ≥ ∆ ≥ 1 and m ≥ 2.
We also use the notion of a ∆-approximation given in Section ??.
Theorem 5.
There exists an algorithm with the following property. Let p be a prime number, and let ∆ be an integer such that p > ∆ ≥ 1. Let
be a polynomial of degree m ≥ 2 over IF p whose leading coefficient a m lies in
Then the algorithm, when given f and ∆-approximations w 0 , w 1 to v 0 , v 1 where
Proof. The proof of this theorem is almost identical to that of Theorem ??.
In particular, we define A m (p, ∆) = F(p, R, S) where as before R = 2 √ m + 2 λ m+2 ∆ m , S = 2 √ m + 2 λ m+2 ∆ and F(p, R, S) is defined as in Section ??. Again, we can assume that 2 √ m + 2 λ m+2 ∆ m < p, and also that p ≥ 17, so that σ(p)/p = (p + 1)/p < 17/16. Now the bound on #A m (p, ∆) follows from Lemma ??.
The only other place where the proof differs from that of Theorem ?? is when we calculate the cardinality of the set V(f ); so we need to count the number of possible solutions to congruences of the form 
solutions to a congruence of the form (??). The proof of Theorem ??, with this counting argument changed, now suffices to prove Theorem ??.
Remarks and Open Questions
It would be very natural to study the case when the polynomial f is not known and forms a part of the secret key. However, we observe that in this case the unique recovery of v 0 (and f ) is not possible. Indeed, it is easy to see that given any number k of 'approximations' w j , which are actually the exact values w j = v j , j = 0, . . . , k − 1, and an integer h, each of the sequences,
Therefore, for any integer h with |h| ≤ ∆ we have |w j −v j−1 (and each polynomial f h ) may give rise to the same sequence of approximations w j . We remark that this argument works for any family F of functions which is closed under the transformation f (X) → f (X + h) − h. The fact that the family of functions f a,b (X) = aX −1 +b does not satisfy this property explains why the inversive congruential generator , u n+1 ≡ au −1 n + b mod q, can be completely recovered even in the case of unknown coefficients; see [?, ?] for the case where q = p is prime. On the other hand, in cryptographic applications we do not need to completely recover v 0 and f : we merely need to be able to continue to generate the sequence of "approximations" w j (formed, say, by taking the > 0 most significant bits of v j , that is w j = 2 2 − v j ). In the case of the linear congruential generator (??), that is, for the family of functions f (X) = aX + b, this issue has been discussed in Section 3 of [?]. In particular it has been noted in [?] that the difference sequence y n = x n+1 − x n satisfies the homogeneous relations y n+1 ≡ ay n (mod q), n = 0, 1, . . . , and can be recovered, which can then be used for finding approximations to the sequence x n . However, for nonlinear functions f this method no longer applies, and finding an analogous method (even a heuristic one) remains an open problem.
In Theorem ?? we have the technical condition that gcd(∆, q) = 1. This condition is needed to be able to define the coefficients A, B, C 1 , . . . , C m .
However, the condition is rather an artificial one: the value ∆ in the algorithm of Theorem ?? may be replaced by any slightly larger value ∆ 0 without significantly altering the algorithm's performance, and so we may ensure that gcd(∆ 0 , q) = 1. For example, ∆ 0 can be chosen to be the smallest prime number which is greater than ∆ and does not divide q. Because q has at most O(log q/ log log q) prime divisors this would lead to only slightly weaker estimates. More precisely, the largest distance J(q) between two integers relatively prime to q is called the Jacobsthal function and has been extensivel studied in the literature, in particular J(q) = O((log q)
2 ), see [?] . We have not used the full power of the bound on λ s in Lemma ??. However using the original estimate λ s ≤ 2 (s−1)/2 of [?] would force us to replace 2∆ in our bounds on A m (p, ∆) and V(f ) in Sections ?? and ?? with a slightly larger multiple of ∆.
